O materialismo transcendental e a coisa em si em ŽiŽek
The present research investigates the meaning of the transcendental materialism proposed by Slavoj Zizek, observing the influence of the question of the transcendental posited by Immanuel Kant, as well as the controversies about the thing in itself and the influence of Jacques Lacan in the unders...
Na minha lista:
| Autor principal: | |
|---|---|
| Outros Autores: | |
| Formato: | Dissertação |
| Idioma: | pt_BR |
| Publicado em: |
Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte
|
| Assuntos: | |
| Endereço do item: | https://repositorio.ufrn.br/handle/123456789/49971 |
| Tags: |
Adicionar Tag
Sem tags, seja o primeiro a adicionar uma tag!
|
| Resumo: | The present research investigates the meaning of the transcendental materialism
proposed by Slavoj Zizek, observing the influence of the question of the transcendental posited
by Immanuel Kant, as well as the controversies about the thing in itself and the influence of
Jacques Lacan in the understanding of a virtual object and the death drive of a virtual object
that takes the place of the thing in itself. We elucidate portion of the conceptual entaglement of
zizekian philosophy that is part of the construction of philosophy and observe its attempt to
constructe an ontology and metaphysics capable of escaping the traps of relativism and realism.
We show that, to proceed with the Kant legacy of thought forces a consistent philosophy to
adopt a kind of skepticism in relation to what is beyond appearances, which Zizek could only
avoid by radically modifying the meaning of the thing in itself, trivializing the question about
what is “beyond appearances”. The world, thus, is contained in its appearing without the
question “what appears?” to be made. The object that is not representation and can, therefore,
take its place is understood as the object of the cause of desire, or in other words, the drive that,
with its negativity, forces the movement of the splited elements into subjet and object; and,
moreover, it precedes and creates the split itself. However, in this research, such negativity
could only be found in the subject, leaving to the object the negativity of non-identity. In this
way, a transcendental materialism that takes drive as matter, as a thing in itself, proves to be
insufficient to overcome skepticism and relativism, due to abandon the thing in itself as
something that exists independently of the subject. A solution found, and according to the
author's thinking, is considered both moments (materialism that assumes the primacy of the
thing in itself and transcendentalism that assumes the primacy of the transcendental
imagination) as irreducible points of perspective and without a third term of synthesis, so it is
necessary to move from one perspective to the other and remain in between to see the parallax
truth of transcendental materialism. |
|---|