O efeito da maldição do vencedor nas contratações públicas da auditoria independente
The independent audit is considered a factor that reduces the asymmetry of accounting information for the market. Its independence is a relevant indicator of signaling as to the quality of its work performed, which seeks to ensure the quality of the accounting information disclosed by the companies....
Na minha lista:
| Autor principal: | |
|---|---|
| Outros Autores: | |
| Formato: | Dissertação |
| Idioma: | pt_BR |
| Publicado em: |
Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte
|
| Assuntos: | |
| Endereço do item: | https://repositorio.ufrn.br/handle/123456789/46932 |
| Tags: |
Adicionar Tag
Sem tags, seja o primeiro a adicionar uma tag!
|
| Resumo: | The independent audit is considered a factor that reduces the asymmetry of accounting
information for the market. Its independence is a relevant indicator of signaling as to the quality
of its work performed, which seeks to ensure the quality of the accounting information disclosed
by the companies. The auditor's remuneration is one of the conditions studied that underlie and
influence its independence and, consequently, the quality of the independent audit. Thus, the
present research aims to investigate the effect of the Winner's Curse on public procurement,
auction modality, of independent auditing. Anchored in the Theory of Auctions and the Curse
of the Winner, the study was carried out with a quantitative approach, resulting in a sample of
forty-six state-owned companies analyzed, in order to total seventy-three observations of hiring
carried out in the period from 2010 to 2020. documental research based on the minutes of
electronic trading sessions and the data collected were analyzed using Multiple Linear
Regression estimated by the Ordinary Least Squares method – OLS – and a complementary test
via Quantile Regression. The tests were performed using the STATA® statistical software,
version 14.0. The results respond positively to the research hypothesis that the contracting
procedure through auction causes a high level of competition between auditing firms, increasing
the variation between the estimated price and the one actually contracted, which positively
affects the occurrence of the debasement of fees, especially initial audits of state-owned
companies and thus the Winner's Curse. With regard to the hypothesis about the impact of the
debasement of fees on the quality of the audit carried out in these companies, using earnings
management as a proxy, the hypothesis was statistically rejected to determine causality and
correlation between the existence of debasement and earnings management. However, in the
additional test using the OLS Regression model without the constant, the regression result
indicates significance for the demeaning variable in relation to the practice of earnings
management. As the main contributions of the study, elements were obtained for professional
and regulatory concern about the effectiveness of the electronic auction for contracting
technical services of independent audit. |
|---|