Gödel's slingshot revisited: does russell's theory of descriptions really evade the slingshot
“Slingshot Arguments” are a family of arguments underlying the Fregean view that if sentences have reference at all, their references are their truth-values. Usually seen as a kind of collapsing argument, the slingshot consists in proving that, once you suppose that there are some items that are...
Na minha lista:
| Autor principal: | |
|---|---|
| Outros Autores: | |
| Formato: | Dissertação |
| Idioma: | por |
| Publicado em: |
Brasil
|
| Assuntos: | |
| Endereço do item: | https://repositorio.ufrn.br/jspui/handle/123456789/22416 |
| Tags: |
Adicionar Tag
Sem tags, seja o primeiro a adicionar uma tag!
|
| Resumo: | “Slingshot Arguments” are a family of arguments underlying the Fregean
view that if sentences have reference at all, their references are their truth-values.
Usually seen as a kind of collapsing argument, the slingshot consists in proving
that, once you suppose that there are some items that are references of sentences
(as facts or situations, for example), these items collapse into just two items: The
True and The False. This dissertation treats of the slingshot dubbed “Gödel’s slingshot”.
Gödel argued that there is a deep connection between these arguments and
definite descriptions. More precisely, according to Gödel, if one adopts Russell’s interpretation
of definite descriptions (which clashes with Frege’s view that definite
descriptions are singular terms), it is possible to evade the slingshot. We challenge
Gödel’s view in two manners, first by presenting a slingshot even with a Russellian
interpretation of definite descriptions and second by presenting a slingshot even
when we change from singular terms to plural terms in the light of new developments
of the so-called Plural Logic. The text is divided in three chapters, in the first,
we present the discussion between Russell and Frege regarding definite descriptions,
in the second, we present Gödel’s position and reconstructions of Gödel’s argument
and in the third we prove our slingshot argument for Plural Logic. In light of these
results we conclude that we can maintain the validity of slingshot arguments even
within a Russellian interpretation of definite descriptions or in the context of Plural
Logic. |
|---|