A responsabilização criminal no estado democrático de direito: o equilíbrio entre a efetividade e os limites da pretensão punitiva da sociedade
This paper analyzes the relationship between fundamental rights and the exercise of the claim punitive society in a democratic state. It starts with the premise that there are fundamental rights that limit and determine the validity of all forms of manifestation of the claim punitive society (leg...
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| Formato: | Dissertação |
| Idioma: | por |
| Publicado em: |
Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte
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| Endereço do item: | https://repositorio.ufrn.br/jspui/handle/123456789/13942 |
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| Resumo: | This paper analyzes the relationship between fundamental rights and the exercise of
the claim punitive society in a democratic state. It starts with the premise that there are
fundamental rights that limit and determine the validity of all forms of manifestation of the
claim punitive society (legislating, investigative, adjudicative or ministerial) and there are
others that require the state the right exercise, fast and effective of these activities. Travels to
history in order to see that the first meaning of these rights was built between the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries, after all a history of abuses committed by state agents in the exercise
of criminal justice, and positively valued in the declarations of human rights and proclaimed
in the constitutions after the American and French Revolutions, while the second meaning has
been assigned between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, when, because of the serious
social problems generated largely by absenteeism state, it was noted that in addition to
subjective rights the individual against the state, fundamental rights are also objective values,
which trigger an order directed the state to protect them against the action of the offending
individuals themselves (duty to protect), the mission of which the State seeks to discharge,
among other means, through the issue of legal rules typifying the behavior detrimental to such
rights, subject to penalties, and the concrete actions of public institutions created by the
Constitution to operate penal law. Under this double bias, it is argued that the rule violates the
Constitution in the exercise of the claim punitive society as much as by excess malfere
fundamental rights that limit, as when it allows facts wrong by offending fundamental rights,
remain unpunished either by inaction or by insufficient measures taken abstractly or
concretely provided |
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