LOBBYING OF THE GLENIF IN THE IASB THE LIGHT OF THE THEORY OF ACTION COLLECTIVE OF OLSON

In 1965, Mancur Olson developed the Theory of Collective Action from the study of rational individuals who form a group with interest in obtaining collective benefits. Later, Lindahl (1987) exposes the Olson's theory based on three categories: (1) the lobbying will not occur unless selective in...

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Principais autores: Azevedo, Elayne Patrícia Ribeiro de Santana, Tavares, Márcia Ferreira Neves
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author Azevedo, Elayne Patrícia Ribeiro de Santana
Tavares, Márcia Ferreira Neves
spellingShingle Azevedo, Elayne Patrícia Ribeiro de Santana
Tavares, Márcia Ferreira Neves
LOBBYING OF THE GLENIF IN THE IASB THE LIGHT OF THE THEORY OF ACTION COLLECTIVE OF OLSON
author_facet Azevedo, Elayne Patrícia Ribeiro de Santana
Tavares, Márcia Ferreira Neves
author_sort Azevedo, Elayne Patrícia Ribeiro de Santana
title LOBBYING OF THE GLENIF IN THE IASB THE LIGHT OF THE THEORY OF ACTION COLLECTIVE OF OLSON
title_short LOBBYING OF THE GLENIF IN THE IASB THE LIGHT OF THE THEORY OF ACTION COLLECTIVE OF OLSON
title_full LOBBYING OF THE GLENIF IN THE IASB THE LIGHT OF THE THEORY OF ACTION COLLECTIVE OF OLSON
title_fullStr LOBBYING OF THE GLENIF IN THE IASB THE LIGHT OF THE THEORY OF ACTION COLLECTIVE OF OLSON
title_full_unstemmed LOBBYING OF THE GLENIF IN THE IASB THE LIGHT OF THE THEORY OF ACTION COLLECTIVE OF OLSON
title_sort lobbying of the glenif in the iasb the light of the theory of action collective of olson
description In 1965, Mancur Olson developed the Theory of Collective Action from the study of rational individuals who form a group with interest in obtaining collective benefits. Later, Lindahl (1987) exposes the Olson's theory based on three categories: (1) the lobbying will not occur unless selective incentives are introduced to motivate individuals to contribute; (2) costs (including organization and monitoring) are smaller in small groups; and (3) the identification of real benefit shared by the largest member of the group. With the appearance of groups with primary interest in influencing the creation and issues of accounting standards issued by the IASB, comes the GLENIF in 2011, with 17 countries the Latin American, with joint efforts and common goals between these countries. With the low representation in research that deal with interest groups with regulators and accounting standard-setting members, this study aims to show the level of theoretical line, from the categories of collective action of Mancur Olson, with the establishment and performance of GLENIF in IASB. For this it evaluates two premises based on the categories of the Theory Collective Action of Olson’s: (1) the receipt of selective incentives by member countries of GLENIF, from a questionnaire sent by the group at a conference held in Mexico; (2) identify if GLENIF represents the interests of its greatest beneficiary: the Brazil, analyzing the six issues outlined in the Revised Exposure Draft regarding the revenue recognition standard issued by the IASB/FASB. Analyze the letters sent by the comments GLENIF and CPC (representing the individual position of Brazil) to identify the existence of positioning of convergence between them and the level of success before the Boards. The results indicate that the letter sent by the CPC does not fully represent the position of Brazil on the interest group (GLENIF) and the level of theoretical alignment of the group is in accordance with two categories of Mancur Olson's theory.Keywords: Lobbying. Comments letters. GLENIF. IFRS. IASB; 
publisher Portal de Periódicos Eletrônicos da UFRN
publishDate 2017
url https://periodicos.ufrn.br/ambiente/article/view/9483
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spelling oai:periodicos.ufrn.br:article-94832021-10-19T15:44:06Z LOBBYING OF THE GLENIF IN THE IASB THE LIGHT OF THE THEORY OF ACTION COLLECTIVE OF OLSON LOBBYING DE GLENIF ANTE O IASB LA LUZ DE LA TEORÍA DE LA ACCION COLECTIVA DE OLSON LOBBYING DO GLENIF PERANTE O IASB À LUZ DA TEORIA DA AÇÃO COLETIVA DE OLSON Azevedo, Elayne Patrícia Ribeiro de Santana Tavares, Márcia Ferreira Neves In 1965, Mancur Olson developed the Theory of Collective Action from the study of rational individuals who form a group with interest in obtaining collective benefits. Later, Lindahl (1987) exposes the Olson's theory based on three categories: (1) the lobbying will not occur unless selective incentives are introduced to motivate individuals to contribute; (2) costs (including organization and monitoring) are smaller in small groups; and (3) the identification of real benefit shared by the largest member of the group. With the appearance of groups with primary interest in influencing the creation and issues of accounting standards issued by the IASB, comes the GLENIF in 2011, with 17 countries the Latin American, with joint efforts and common goals between these countries. With the low representation in research that deal with interest groups with regulators and accounting standard-setting members, this study aims to show the level of theoretical line, from the categories of collective action of Mancur Olson, with the establishment and performance of GLENIF in IASB. For this it evaluates two premises based on the categories of the Theory Collective Action of Olson’s: (1) the receipt of selective incentives by member countries of GLENIF, from a questionnaire sent by the group at a conference held in Mexico; (2) identify if GLENIF represents the interests of its greatest beneficiary: the Brazil, analyzing the six issues outlined in the Revised Exposure Draft regarding the revenue recognition standard issued by the IASB/FASB. Analyze the letters sent by the comments GLENIF and CPC (representing the individual position of Brazil) to identify the existence of positioning of convergence between them and the level of success before the Boards. The results indicate that the letter sent by the CPC does not fully represent the position of Brazil on the interest group (GLENIF) and the level of theoretical alignment of the group is in accordance with two categories of Mancur Olson's theory.Keywords: Lobbying. Comments letters. GLENIF. IFRS. IASB;  En 1965, Mancur Olson desarrolló la teoría de la acción colectiva a partir del estudio de los individuos racionales que forman un grupo con interés en obtener beneficios colectivos. Más tarde, Lindahl (1987) expone la teoría de Olson basado en tres categorías: (1) la presión no ocurrirá a menos que se introducen incentivos selectivos para motivar a las personas a contribuir; (2) los costos (incluyendo la organización y seguimiento) son más pequeños en grupos pequeños; y (3) la identificación de beneficio real compartida por el miembro más grande del grupo. Con la aparición de grupos con intereses influyendo en la creación y cuestiones de las normas contables emitidas por el IASB, lo GLENIF se forman en 2011, por 17 países de normalización de América Latina, con los esfuerzos conjuntos y objetivos comunes entre estos países. Con la baja representación en la investigación sobre los grupos de interés con los miembros reguladores y emisores de normas contables, este estudio tiene como objetivo mostrar el nivel de la línea teórica, a partir de las categorías de la acción colectiva de Mancur Olson, con el establecimiento y el funcionamiento de GLENIF antes de la IASB. Para eso, se evalúa dos premisas sobre la base de las categorías de la teoría de la acción colectiva de Olson: (1) la recepción de incentivos selectivos de los países miembros de GLENIF de un cuestionario enviado por el grupo en una conferencia celebrada en México; (2) identificar si el GLENIF representa los intereses de su mayor beneficiario: el Brasil, basado en el análisis de las seis cuestiones descritas en el Proyecto de Norma Revisada en relación con el estándar de reconocimiento de ingresos emitida por el IASB/FASB. Se analiza las cartas comentarios enviadas por el GLENIF y CPC (que representa la posición individual de Brasil) para identificar la existencia de posicionamiento de la convergencia entre ellos y el nivel de éxito ante los Boards. Los resultados indican que la carta enviada por el CPC no es representativa de la posición de Brasil en el grupo de interés (GLENIF) y el nivel de alineación teórica del grupo es de acuerdo con dos categorías de la teoría de Mancur Olson.Palabras clave: Grupos de presión. Letras comentarios. GLENIF. IFRS. IASB; Em 1965, Mancur Olson desenvolveu a Teoria da Ação Coletiva a partir do estudo dos indivíduos racionais que formam um grupo com o interesse na obtenção de benefícios coletivos. Posteriormente, Lindahl (1987) fundamentou a teoria de Olson com base em três categorias: (1) o lobbying não ocorrerá a menos que incentivos seletivos sejam introduzidos para motivar os indivíduos a contribuírem; (2) os custos (incluídos os de organização e monitoramento) são menores em pequenos grupos; e (3) a identificação do real benefício compartilhado pelo maior membro do grupo. Diante do surgimento de grupos com o interesse precípuo em influenciar a criação e as edições das normas contábeis emitidas pelo IASB, constitui-se o GLENIF, em 2011, por normatizadores de 17 países Latino-Americanos, com a união de esforços e objetivos em comum entre esses países. Com a baixa representatividade em pesquisas que tratem sobre grupos de interesse com integrantes reguladores e normatizadores contábeis, este estudo objetiva evidenciar o nível de consonância teórica, a partir das categorias da ação coletiva de Mancur Olson, com a constituição e atuação do GLENIF, diante do IASB. Para isso, avalia-se duas premissas com base nas categorias da Teoria da Ação Coletiva de Olson: (1) o recebimento de incentivos seletivos pelos países-membros do GLENIF, a partir de um questionário enviado pelo grupo, em uma conferência realizada no México; (2) identificar se o GLENIF representa o interesse do seu maior beneficiário: o Brasil, analisando as seis questões expostas no Revised Exposure Draft referente à norma de reconhecimento de receita emitida pelo IASB/FASB. Analisam-se as comments letters enviadas pelo GLENIF e pelo CPC (representando o posicionamento individual do Brasil) para identificar a existência de convergência de posicionamento entre eles e o nível de sucesso obtido perante os Boards. Os resultados obtidos apontam que a carta enviada pelo CPC não representa integralmente o posicionamento do Brasil sobre o grupo de interesse (GLENIF) e o nível de alinhamento teórico do grupo está em conformidade com duas categorias da teoria de Mancur Olson.Palavras-chave: Lobbying. Comments letters. GLENIF. IFRS. IASB. Portal de Periódicos Eletrônicos da UFRN 2017-01-02 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf https://periodicos.ufrn.br/ambiente/article/view/9483 REVISTA AMBIENTE CONTÁBIL - Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte; Vol. 9 No. 1 (2017): Jan./Jun.; 268-289 REVISTA AMBIENTE CONTÁBIL - Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte; Vol. 9 Núm. 1 (2017): Jan./Jun.; 268-289 REVISTA AMBIENTE CONTÁBIL - Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte - ISSN 2176-9036; v. 9 n. 1 (2017): Jan./Jun.; 268-289 2176-9036 10.21680/2176-9036.2017v9n1 por https://periodicos.ufrn.br/ambiente/article/view/9483/7873 Copyright (c) 2017 REVISTA AMBIENTE CONTÁBIL - Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte - ISSN 2176-9036

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