THE RELATIONS OF DIVIDENDS, DEBT AND BOARD OF DIRECTORS WITH PERFORMANCE: A COMPARISON BETWEEN FAMILY AND NON FAMILY FIRMS
The objective of this work is to identify the relationship of dividend payments, debt level and the board of directors with the financial performance of companies familiar and no familiar. We conclude that family firms do not have higher levels of dividend payments to remain effective in controlling...
Na minha lista:
Principais autores: | , , |
---|---|
Formato: | Online |
Idioma: | por |
Publicado em: |
Portal de Periódicos Eletrônicos da UFRN
|
Endereço do item: | https://periodicos.ufrn.br/ambiente/article/view/5721 |
Tags: |
Adicionar Tag
Sem tags, seja o primeiro a adicionar uma tag!
|
id |
oai:periodicos.ufrn.br:article-5721 |
---|---|
record_format |
ojs |
spelling |
oai:periodicos.ufrn.br:article-57212021-11-23T11:16:31Z THE RELATIONS OF DIVIDENDS, DEBT AND BOARD OF DIRECTORS WITH PERFORMANCE: A COMPARISON BETWEEN FAMILY AND NON FAMILY FIRMS RELACIÓN DE DIVIDENDOS Y DEUDA Y CONSEJO DE ADMINISTRACIÓN CON RENDIMIENTO: UNA COMPARACIÓN ENTRE EMPRESAS FAMILIARES Y NO FAMILIARES RELAÇÃO DOS DIVIDENDOS, DÍVIDA E CONSELHO DE ADMINISTRAÇÃO COM O DESEMPENHO: UM COMPARATIVO ENTRE EMPRESAS FAMILIARES E NÃO FAMILIARES Kreuzberg, Fernanda Cunha, Paulo Roberto da Popik, Fabiane The objective of this work is to identify the relationship of dividend payments, debt level and the board of directors with the financial performance of companies familiar and no familiar. We conclude that family firms do not have higher levels of dividend payments to remain effective in controlling agency problems II. To mitigate agency problems I see companies no familiar presence of a high number of independent directors on the board, as an essential mechanism for agency problems.Keywords: Agency theory. Dividends. Debt. Performance. Familiar and no familiar firms. El objetivo de este trabajo es identificar la relación entre los pagos de dividendos, el nivel de deuda y el consejo de administración con el desempeño de empresas familiares y no familiares. Llegamos a la conclusión de que las empresas familiares no tienen los niveles más altos de los pagos de dividendos para mantener su eficacia en el control de los problemas de agencia II. La mitigación de los problemas de agencia que veo las no familiares la presencia de un gran número de consejeros independientes en el consejo, como un mecanismo esencial para los problemas de agencia.Palabras clave: Teoría de la agencia. Dividendos. Deuda. Rendimiento. Empresas familiares y no familiares. O objetivo deste trabalho consiste em identificar a relação do pagamento de dividendos, do nível da dívida e do conselho de administração com o desempenho financeiro das empresas familiares e não familiares. Conclui-se que as empresas familiares não possuem níveis mais elevados de pagamento de dividendos para manter a eficácia no controle dos problemas de agência II. Para a mitigação dos problemas de agência I as empresas não familiares veem a presença de um elevado número de conselheiros independentes no conselho de administração, como um mecanismo essencial para os problemas de agência.Palavras-chave: Teoria da agência. Dividendos. Dívida. Desempenho. Empresas familiares e não familiares. Portal de Periódicos Eletrônicos da UFRN 2016-01-03 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf https://periodicos.ufrn.br/ambiente/article/view/5721 REVISTA AMBIENTE CONTÁBIL - Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte; Vol. 8 No. 1 (2016): Jan./Jun.; 34-59 REVISTA AMBIENTE CONTÁBIL - Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte; Vol. 8 Núm. 1 (2016): Jan./Jun.; 34-59 REVISTA AMBIENTE CONTÁBIL - Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte - ISSN 2176-9036; v. 8 n. 1 (2016): Jan./Jun.; 34-59 2176-9036 10.21680/2176-9036.2016v8n1 por https://periodicos.ufrn.br/ambiente/article/view/5721/5988 Copyright (c) 2016 REVISTA AMBIENTE CONTÁBIL - Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte - ISSN 2176-9036 |
institution |
Periódicos UFRN |
collection |
Portal de Pediódicos Eletrônicos da UFRN |
language |
por |
format |
Online |
author |
Kreuzberg, Fernanda Cunha, Paulo Roberto da Popik, Fabiane |
spellingShingle |
Kreuzberg, Fernanda Cunha, Paulo Roberto da Popik, Fabiane THE RELATIONS OF DIVIDENDS, DEBT AND BOARD OF DIRECTORS WITH PERFORMANCE: A COMPARISON BETWEEN FAMILY AND NON FAMILY FIRMS |
author_facet |
Kreuzberg, Fernanda Cunha, Paulo Roberto da Popik, Fabiane |
author_sort |
Kreuzberg, Fernanda |
title |
THE RELATIONS OF DIVIDENDS, DEBT AND BOARD OF DIRECTORS WITH PERFORMANCE: A COMPARISON BETWEEN FAMILY AND NON FAMILY FIRMS |
title_short |
THE RELATIONS OF DIVIDENDS, DEBT AND BOARD OF DIRECTORS WITH PERFORMANCE: A COMPARISON BETWEEN FAMILY AND NON FAMILY FIRMS |
title_full |
THE RELATIONS OF DIVIDENDS, DEBT AND BOARD OF DIRECTORS WITH PERFORMANCE: A COMPARISON BETWEEN FAMILY AND NON FAMILY FIRMS |
title_fullStr |
THE RELATIONS OF DIVIDENDS, DEBT AND BOARD OF DIRECTORS WITH PERFORMANCE: A COMPARISON BETWEEN FAMILY AND NON FAMILY FIRMS |
title_full_unstemmed |
THE RELATIONS OF DIVIDENDS, DEBT AND BOARD OF DIRECTORS WITH PERFORMANCE: A COMPARISON BETWEEN FAMILY AND NON FAMILY FIRMS |
title_sort |
relations of dividends, debt and board of directors with performance: a comparison between family and non family firms |
description |
The objective of this work is to identify the relationship of dividend payments, debt level and the board of directors with the financial performance of companies familiar and no familiar. We conclude that family firms do not have higher levels of dividend payments to remain effective in controlling agency problems II. To mitigate agency problems I see companies no familiar presence of a high number of independent directors on the board, as an essential mechanism for agency problems.Keywords: Agency theory. Dividends. Debt. Performance. Familiar and no familiar firms. |
publisher |
Portal de Periódicos Eletrônicos da UFRN |
publishDate |
2016 |
url |
https://periodicos.ufrn.br/ambiente/article/view/5721 |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT kreuzbergfernanda therelationsofdividendsdebtandboardofdirectorswithperformanceacomparisonbetweenfamilyandnonfamilyfirms AT cunhapaulorobertoda therelationsofdividendsdebtandboardofdirectorswithperformanceacomparisonbetweenfamilyandnonfamilyfirms AT popikfabiane therelationsofdividendsdebtandboardofdirectorswithperformanceacomparisonbetweenfamilyandnonfamilyfirms AT kreuzbergfernanda relaciondedividendosydeudayconsejodeadministracionconrendimientounacomparacionentreempresasfamiliaresynofamiliares AT cunhapaulorobertoda relaciondedividendosydeudayconsejodeadministracionconrendimientounacomparacionentreempresasfamiliaresynofamiliares AT popikfabiane relaciondedividendosydeudayconsejodeadministracionconrendimientounacomparacionentreempresasfamiliaresynofamiliares AT kreuzbergfernanda relacaodosdividendosdividaeconselhodeadministracaocomodesempenhoumcomparativoentreempresasfamiliaresenaofamiliares AT cunhapaulorobertoda relacaodosdividendosdividaeconselhodeadministracaocomodesempenhoumcomparativoentreempresasfamiliaresenaofamiliares AT popikfabiane relacaodosdividendosdividaeconselhodeadministracaocomodesempenhoumcomparativoentreempresasfamiliaresenaofamiliares AT kreuzbergfernanda relationsofdividendsdebtandboardofdirectorswithperformanceacomparisonbetweenfamilyandnonfamilyfirms AT cunhapaulorobertoda relationsofdividendsdebtandboardofdirectorswithperformanceacomparisonbetweenfamilyandnonfamilyfirms AT popikfabiane relationsofdividendsdebtandboardofdirectorswithperformanceacomparisonbetweenfamilyandnonfamilyfirms |
_version_ |
1766682021088722944 |