English
I answer in this paper to Stuart Brock’s (2010, 2016) main objection to artifactualism. According to Brock, artifactualists like Amie Thomasson (1999) can’t explain how and when fictional objects are created, thus taking artifactualism as a sort of theological creationism. Contrary to Brock, and ada...
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| Formato: | Online |
| Idioma: | por |
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EDUFRN
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| Endereço do item: | https://periodicos.ufrn.br/principios/article/view/23120 |
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| Resumo: | I answer in this paper to Stuart Brock’s (2010, 2016) main objection to artifactualism. According to Brock, artifactualists like Amie Thomasson (1999) can’t explain how and when fictional objects are created, thus taking artifactualism as a sort of theological creationism. Contrary to Brock, and adapting John Austin’s (1962) speech act theory to this case, I argue that fictional objects are created through a performative utterance that, in order to be felicitous, has to be (i) made by an adequate individual (an author), (ii) with the proper intentions (the act of fiction-making), (iii) in an appropriate context (associated with our pre-established practices of fiction) where the author (iv) names, gives at least a description or provides an image in order to institute the individual object through his or her intentional acts. |
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