Varieties of mental states and theories of self-knowledge

This article deals with self-knowledge of beliefs. There are several mental states with their own peculiarities. Desires, judgments, feelings, emotions and beliefs. The focus of the article is on the knowledge of one's beliefs. Self-knowledge has characteristics, namely, first-person authority,...

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Autor principal: Barcelos, Robson da Rosa
Formato: Online
Idioma:por
Publicado em: EDUFRN
Endereço do item:https://periodicos.ufrn.br/principios/article/view/17922
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spelling oai:periodicos.ufrn.br:article-179222019-10-11T19:01:13Z Varieties of mental states and theories of self-knowledge Variedades de estados mentais e a teoria do Autoconhecimento de crenças Barcelos, Robson da Rosa Self-knowledge; Mental states; Beliefs. Autoconhecimento; Estados mentais; Crenças. This article deals with self-knowledge of beliefs. There are several mental states with their own peculiarities. Desires, judgments, feelings, emotions and beliefs. The focus of the article is on the knowledge of one's beliefs. Self-knowledge has characteristics, namely, first-person authority, aprioristic character, cognitive-discriminative capacity, infallibility, omniscience, asymmetry between the first and third person and impossibility of misuse of the pronoun "I" (SILVA FILHO, 2013, p. 33, n.2). In the everyday realm of common sense, there is no doubt about the self-attribution of beliefs, but concepts are not always used correctly, that is, there is an incomplete understanding of one's beliefs. However, does attributing rationality to the agent require knowledge of one's beliefs? According to Coliva (2016), there are dispositional beliefs and as commitment. With respect to the first type of belief, the agent has no epistemic responsibility, with the second yes. Therefore, self-knowledge of doxastic beliefs as commitment requires rationality of the epistemic agent, because there is the epistemic responsibility of the rational agent. O presente artigo versa sobre autoconhecimento de crenças. Há vários estados mentais com suas próprias particularidades. Desejos, julgamentos, sensações, emoções e crenças. O foco do artigo é sobre o conhecimento das próprias crenças. O autoconhecimento possui características, a saber, autoridade de primeira pessoa, caráter apriorístico, capacidade cognitivo-discriminativa, infalibilidade, onisciência, assimetria entre a primeira e terceira pessoa e impossibilidade do uso equivocado do pronome “eu” (SILVA FILHO, 2013, p. 33, n. 2). No âmbito cotidiano do senso comum, não há dúvidas acerca da autoatribuição de crenças, porém nem sempre se utiliza corretamente os conceitos, ou seja, há o entendimento incompleto sobre as próprias crenças. Contudo, será que atribuir racionalidade ao agente requer o conhecimento das próprias crenças? Conforme Coliva (2016), há crenças disposicionais e como compromisso. Com relação ao primeiro tipo de crença, o agente não possui responsabilidade epistêmica, já com a segunda sim. Portanto, autoconhecimento de crenças doxásticas enquanto compromisso, requer racionalidade do agente epistêmico, pois há a responsabilidade epistêmica do agente racional. EDUFRN 2019-09-30 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion Avaliado pelos pares application/pdf https://periodicos.ufrn.br/principios/article/view/17922 Princípios: Revista de Filosofia (UFRN); v. 26 n. 51 (2019): Princípios: Revista de Filosofia (UFRN); 185-203 1983-2109 0104-8694 10.21680/1983-2109.2019v26n51 por https://periodicos.ufrn.br/principios/article/view/17922/12125 Copyright (c) 2019 Robson da Rosa Barcelos
institution Periódicos UFRN
collection Portal de Pediódicos Eletrônicos da UFRN
language por
format Online
author Barcelos, Robson da Rosa
spellingShingle Barcelos, Robson da Rosa
Varieties of mental states and theories of self-knowledge
author_facet Barcelos, Robson da Rosa
author_sort Barcelos, Robson da Rosa
title Varieties of mental states and theories of self-knowledge
title_short Varieties of mental states and theories of self-knowledge
title_full Varieties of mental states and theories of self-knowledge
title_fullStr Varieties of mental states and theories of self-knowledge
title_full_unstemmed Varieties of mental states and theories of self-knowledge
title_sort varieties of mental states and theories of self-knowledge
description This article deals with self-knowledge of beliefs. There are several mental states with their own peculiarities. Desires, judgments, feelings, emotions and beliefs. The focus of the article is on the knowledge of one's beliefs. Self-knowledge has characteristics, namely, first-person authority, aprioristic character, cognitive-discriminative capacity, infallibility, omniscience, asymmetry between the first and third person and impossibility of misuse of the pronoun "I" (SILVA FILHO, 2013, p. 33, n.2). In the everyday realm of common sense, there is no doubt about the self-attribution of beliefs, but concepts are not always used correctly, that is, there is an incomplete understanding of one's beliefs. However, does attributing rationality to the agent require knowledge of one's beliefs? According to Coliva (2016), there are dispositional beliefs and as commitment. With respect to the first type of belief, the agent has no epistemic responsibility, with the second yes. Therefore, self-knowledge of doxastic beliefs as commitment requires rationality of the epistemic agent, because there is the epistemic responsibility of the rational agent.
publisher EDUFRN
publishDate 2019
url https://periodicos.ufrn.br/principios/article/view/17922
work_keys_str_mv AT barcelosrobsondarosa varietiesofmentalstatesandtheoriesofselfknowledge
AT barcelosrobsondarosa variedadesdeestadosmentaiseateoriadoautoconhecimentodecrencas
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