O ceticismo antifideísta de Hume
Hume's skepticism may seem close to skeptical fideism in view of his critique of human faculties involved in the knowledge of truth and his defense of the need for a non-rational mechanism as foundation of our beliefs. The difference between them would lie in the identification of the solution...
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oai:periodicos.ufrn.br:article-169052019-06-19T19:29:36Z O ceticismo antifideísta de Hume Santos, Rafael Bittencourt Skepticism Fideism Misticism Empiricism Hume Ceticismo Fideísmo Misticismo Empirismo Hume Hume's skepticism may seem close to skeptical fideism in view of his critique of human faculties involved in the knowledge of truth and his defense of the need for a non-rational mechanism as foundation of our beliefs. The difference between them would lie in the identification of the solution to the suspension of judgment resulting from the discovery of the insufficiency of reason to understand the world and to guide action: one would point to natural determination, another to Revelation. I argue here that this closeness is no more than apparent. Hume's philosophy is constituted as antifideist not only for prudential, practical or pragmatic reasons, but also for its philosophical foundations. To show it, I examine the discussion between Demea and Philo in the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, the investigation into the origin of religion in the Natural History of Religion and the reasons for the recommendation of philosophy to superstition in the Treatise of Human Nature. O ceticismo de Hume pode parecer próximo do fideísmo cético em virtude da sua crítica às faculdades humanas envolvidas no conhecimento da verdade e da sua defesa da necessidade de um mecanismo não racional como fundamento das nossas crenças. A diferença entre ambos estaria na identificação da solução para a suspensão do juízo resultante da descoberta da insuficiência da razão para compreender o mundo e guiar a ação: um apontaria para a determinação natural, outro, para a Revelação. Argumento aqui que essa proximidade não é mais do que aparente. A filosofia de Hume constitui-se como antifideísta não apenas por razões prudenciais, práticas ou pragmáticas, mas também pelos seus fundamentos filosóficos. Para mostrá-lo, examino a discussão entre Dêmeas e Filão nos Diálogos sobre a Religião Natural, a investigação sobre a origem da religião na História Natural da Religião e as razões para a recomendação da filosofia ante a superstição no Tratado da Natureza Humana. EDUFRN 2019-05-30 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion Avaliado pelos pares application/pdf https://periodicos.ufrn.br/principios/article/view/16905 Princípios: Revista de Filosofia (UFRN); v. 26 n. 50 (2019): Princípios: Revista de Filosofia (UFRN); 305-333 1983-2109 0104-8694 10.21680/1983-2109.2019v26n50 por https://periodicos.ufrn.br/principios/article/view/16905/11667 Copyright (c) 2019 Rafael Bittencourt Santos |
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Online |
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Santos, Rafael Bittencourt |
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Santos, Rafael Bittencourt O ceticismo antifideísta de Hume |
| author_facet |
Santos, Rafael Bittencourt |
| author_sort |
Santos, Rafael Bittencourt |
| title |
O ceticismo antifideísta de Hume |
| title_short |
O ceticismo antifideísta de Hume |
| title_full |
O ceticismo antifideísta de Hume |
| title_fullStr |
O ceticismo antifideísta de Hume |
| title_full_unstemmed |
O ceticismo antifideísta de Hume |
| title_sort |
o ceticismo antifideísta de hume |
| description |
Hume's skepticism may seem close to skeptical fideism in view of his critique of human faculties involved in the knowledge of truth and his defense of the need for a non-rational mechanism as foundation of our beliefs. The difference between them would lie in the identification of the solution to the suspension of judgment resulting from the discovery of the insufficiency of reason to understand the world and to guide action: one would point to natural determination, another to Revelation. I argue here that this closeness is no more than apparent. Hume's philosophy is constituted as antifideist not only for prudential, practical or pragmatic reasons, but also for its philosophical foundations. To show it, I examine the discussion between Demea and Philo in the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, the investigation into the origin of religion in the Natural History of Religion and the reasons for the recommendation of philosophy to superstition in the Treatise of Human Nature. |
| publisher |
EDUFRN |
| publishDate |
2019 |
| url |
https://periodicos.ufrn.br/principios/article/view/16905 |
| work_keys_str_mv |
AT santosrafaelbittencourt oceticismoantifideistadehume |
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